Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1983, Vol. 45, No. 3, 641-662

Individual Differences in Status Generalization: Effects of Need for Social Approval, Anticipated Interpersonal Contact, and Instrumental Task Abilities

Harry J. Martin
Department of Management and Labor
Cleveland State University

Theodore N. Greenstein
Department of Sociology
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Status generalization is the process through which the external status of actors is used to determine important features of social interaction. Berger and his associates used expectation states theory to explain status generalization and the inequalities in power and prestige that emerge in task-oriented groups. Two studies were conducted to extend the scope of this theory and investigate the hypothesis that need for social approval and differences in relative status between actors combine to structure the status-organizing process. Study 1 focused on the role of normative dependence. Results showed that approval-motivated persons were influenced by status more than their low-approval counterparts when making decisions on a cooperative group task, especially if face-to-face contact with their partner was anticipated. Study 2 focused on the role of informational dependence. Subjects in this study did not expect to meet their partner; however, a specific ability related to successful performance was introduced. A similar interaction between need for social approval and status was observed, but the effect was limited to conditions in which a task ability was present. The findings were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the construct of need for social approval contains both an approval-seeking and a defensiveness component that are differentially activated by the anticipation of interpersonal contact and the presence of a task ability that makes performance relevant to self-conceptions.

Status generalization is the process through which the external status of actors is used to structure social interaction. Previous research has shown that social characteristics of actors tend to organize the power and prestige orderings within informal task groups. The purpose of this investigation is to explore this phenomenon further and present the results of two studies designed to assess the effect of personality and selected situational variables on the status-organizing process.

In early studies of group behavior, Bales and his associates (Bales, 1953; Bales & Slater, 1955) found that ad hoc groups working on a collective task develop a hierarchy of influence within the group. Some actors participate to a greater degree, receive more action opportunities, make more suggestions, are evaluated more positively on leadership and guidance, and have greater influence over the group's decision making than other members. These components of interaction tend to be highly correlated and together define the observable power and prestige order of the group.

Subsequent research has demonstrated that similar inequalities develop when an actor possesses some external status characteristic such as sex, race, age, or occupation. Studies of mock juries (Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1957; Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956), mixed-race work groups (Katz, 1970), and organizational position (Caudill, 1958) have shown that status

The data described here were part of a doctoral dissertation submitted by the first author to the Department of Psychology, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Portions of this study were also reported at the 87th annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York, September 1979. Thanks and appreciation are extended to Jack McKillip, Nerella Ramanaiah, Tom Mitchell, and Tom Schill for their support while serving on the first author's dissertation committee. Thanks are also extended to an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Theodore N. Greenstein is now at the University of Texas at Arlington.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Harry J. Martin, Department of Management and Labor, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio 44115.

is closely associated with inequalities in power and prestige even when the external status characteristic is irrelevant to the group's task (Torrance, 1973). These and similar findings, from other studies of both naturally occurring and ad hoc groups lead to the empirical generalization that when a task group is differentiated with respect to some socially valued status characteristic, the power and prestige order of the group is determined by that characteristic regardless of whether it is relevant to the task.

Expectation States Theory

To account for this empirical generalization, a set of formal theories based on attributional processes has been developed within a research tradition known as expectation states theory (J. Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1974; J. Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; J. Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Humphreys & Berger, 1981). These theories state that, based on status information, group members tend to form stabilized beliefs regarding the abilities of actors to contribute to a particular task (given two or more individuals who are motivated to perform successfully a task requiring collective action and who are differentiated on one or more socially valued characteristics). Furthermore, these performance expectations, or expectation states, are formed in a manner consistent with differences in the status characteristics that differentiate the group's members. These status characteristics may be diffuse (e.g., race, sex, age) or specific (e.g., mathematical or reading skills) and serve as cues regarding possession of some performance characteristic instrumental to achieving success. It is proposed that these expectations for performance determine the observable power and prestige order of the group in the following manner.

The theory is formulated from the point of view of an actor (p) oriented toward at least two social objects, him- or herself (p') and another person (o). Given that p and o are members of a task group, and that p and o are differentiated by a single socially valued status characteristic, let us assume that p possesses the less highly valued state of the characteristic. P should then form a low performance expectation for her- or himself (e_p) and a relatively higher expectation for o (e_o) with regard to a performance characteristic that is perceived to be instrumental to success (C^*).

Given the desire to do well and the belief that o is more likely to be successful at the task, p will assume a position lower in the power and prestige order than o. Specifically, the theory predicts that p will (a) make fewer performance outputs, (b) evaluate his or her own performance outputs less favorably, (c) be influenced more frequently, and (d) receive fewer action opportunities than o.

According to J. Berger et al. (1977), the following function can be used to predict behavior in their experimental situation:

$$P(s) = m + q(e_p - e_o), \qquad (1)$$

where $P(s)$ is the proportion of disagreements that p resolves in his or her favor (a measure of rejection of influence); m is the subject's baseline propensity to reject influence (determined in large measure by the nature of the task regardless of expectations about who is right); e_p and e_o are the expectations that p associates with p' and o, respectively (thus, $e_p - e_o$ is p's "expectation advantage"); and q is a parameter that reflects all the elements that indicate how important these expectations are to p in a particular situation.

Hypotheses derived from expectation states theory have been confirmed for such diffuse status characteristics as educational attainment (Moore, 1968; Zelditch, Lauderdale, & Stublarec, 1980), sex (Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977; Pugh & Wahrman, 1983), race (Webster & Driskell, 1978), military rank (J. Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972), and age (Freese & Cohen, 1973; Knottnerus & Greenstein, 1981). The dependent variable in each of these studies was influence, and the general finding of these and other studies has been that individuals possessing the more highly valued state of the differentiating characteristic tend to be more influential than individuals possessing the less highly valued state, regardless of the relevance of the characteristic to the task at hand.

Internal Sources of Variation and Social Influence

The point of departure for the present research is that expectation states theory makes the implicit assumption that all actors are

equally susceptible to the formation of differential performance expectations. Within this framework, status characteristics and the expectations they create are viewed as properties of social relationships, not of individuals. That is, q in Equation 1 is determined primarily by forces located within the external environment. However, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for taking a closer look at the role of individual differences in the status-organizing process.

A large body of literature exists that suggests that certain aspects of personality are related to susceptibility to influence (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955; Linton & Graham, 1959; McGhee & Teevan, 1967; Mouton, Blake, & Olmstead, 1956). It also has been suggested that personality characteristics interact with situational variables to account for a greater proportion of variance in behavior than either source alone (e.g., Endler & Magnusson, 1976; McGuire, 1968). For example, Dittes (1959; Dittes & Kelley, 1956) found that a person's willingness to accept influence is a function of both self-esteem and acceptance by the group.

In view of previous research in the area of social influence, it is likely that selected individual-differences factors interact with situational variables (such as status) to affect the formation of power and prestige orders in task-oriented groups. The present approach locates the stability of the status-organizing process neither solely in external aspects of social interaction nor solely in terms of individual differences. Rather, we propose that the power and prestige orderings of groups are the result of an interactive process involving both personality and situational factors.

However, to extend expectation states theory into the realm of individual differences, we had to reexamine the basic mechanism underlying the formation and stability of power and prestige in task-oriented groups. J. Berger et al. (1977) account for an actor's behavior in terms of the formation of task-specific performance expectations. However, if an actor's personality is taken into account, then the ability of groups to influence self-definition becomes salient. One theory that addresses the role of others in self-definition places a strong emphasis on social comparison (Jones & Gerard, 1967).

Early studies of communication in small groups conducted by Festinger (1950, 1954) postulated that pressures toward uniformity in group opinion originate from efforts to reach consensus on the group's task as well as efforts to verify beliefs through social comparison. Building on this work, Kelley (1952) postulated that reference groups serve a dual function as both *normative* and *informational* sources of comparison that determine varying degrees of dependence among members. Normative dependence occurs because groups seek to set and enforce standards of behavior and are usually in a position to administer positive and negative sanctions. Members also seek to maintain or improve their standing within the group. This increases levels of dependence, motivating greater avoidance of disagreement and increasing susceptibility to influence. On the other hand, informational dependence occurs as individuals attempt to validate beliefs regarding the external world using group judgments as a standard of comparison. A similar distinction between types of social influence has been advanced by Deutsch and Gerard (1955) and Thibaut and Strickland (1956).

It is important to make a distinction between this approach to group influence and the expectation states model. From a review of expectation states literature, it may be concluded that the theory is concerned primarily with informational dependence among actors. J. Berger et al. (1977) focused on the attributions that p makes regarding the abilities of p' and o based on status information. Members of task-oriented groups are viewed as dependent on one another only in their efforts to structure a somewhat ambiguous environment, determine its meaning, and assess possibilities for action. Little attention is given to the ability of members to administer sanctions or control social rewards, nor are the needs of individuals to seek and maintain membership considered. These processes lie outside the purview of the theory as it is currently formulated (i.e., relatively little attention has been given to normative aspects of q in Equation 1). To incorporate individual differences and develop a more comprehensive theory of status generalization, the expectation states model should be expanded to include the impact of normative social influence.

Because this study has taken the position that status generalization is likely to be a function of normative as well as informational social influence, those personality and environmental factors that define *q* need to be isolated and systematically investigated. To add clarity to the analysis of these factors, this article has been divided into two separate sections. Study 1 focuses on normative social influence and its role in the status-organizing process, whereas Study 2 focuses on the role of informational social influence.

Study 1

In developing this extended model of status generalization, individual differences in need for social approval, the relative status of actors, and the anticipation of interpersonal contact were considered.

Need for social approval (NSA) was selected as the personality variable of interest because it appears to play a central role in human social interaction (e.g., Coopersmith, 1967; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1974; Linton & Graham, 1959; Marlowe & Gergen, 1970). The greater the need for social approval, the more an individual seeks positive evaluations from other group members and attempts to avoid negative evaluations, hence, the greater the normative social influence held by the group.

The significance of the source of this approval also has been shown to be a key variable in determining individual behavior in group settings (e.g., Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Jackson & Saltzstein, 1958; Jones, Gergen, & Jones, 1963; Lott & Lott, 1961; Wyer, 1966). These findings suggest that an actor's relative status has an important effect on compliance, with lower status individuals showing greater susceptibility to normative influence than higher status persons.

Finally, interpersonal contact, or the anticipation of contact, is a component of the situation that has a substantial impact on the degree of normative dependence among actors. Anticipated contact has been shown to moderate not only conformity to group norms (e.g., Argyle, 1957; Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Gerard, 1961, 1964; Satow, 1975) but also social perception (Jones & Daugherty, 1959), attraction (Insko & Wilson, 1977; Layton & Insko, 1974), and evaluations of others (Darley & Berscheid, 1967; Tyler & Sears, 1977). If contact is expected between actors, then the administration of positive and negative sanctions is possible; hence, normative dependence exists. If there is no contact between actors, or if no contact is expected, then there can be no normative social influence.

Thus, we propose that status organizes interaction, in part, by helping to define the level of normative dependence among actors. Lower status actors make fewer performance outputs, evaluate others more positively, and are more easily persuaded in group settings not only because of differential performance expectations but because they are more dependent on group members for valued social rewards. Hence, they act in a fashion designed to gain approval and are less willing to take action where they risk disapproval. Higher status members, on the other hand, have higher rates of participation, receive more action opportunities, and are more influential because the reward value of their approval to other group members is high and because they themselves are less dependent on the group for valued social rewards.

However, this process is moderated by differences among actors in their need for social approval. It is expected that low-NSA individuals will participate to a greater extent in group discussions and show less conformity than their approval-motivated counterparts, regardless of their relative status. In contrast, high-approval seekers are expected to be more dependent on other group members and, thus, will respond to higher status persons with less participation and greater conformity.

In summary, we propose an interactive model that suggests that status organizes interaction, in part, through its ability to define levels of normative dependence among actors. To evaluate this interactive model, we tested three specific research hypotheses. Given a group consisting of two actors who (a) are collectively oriented and success motivated with respect to a particular task and (b) interact under conditions of anticipated interpersonal contact, we proposed that

1. Individuals with a high need for social approval would accept influence more often

than individuals with a low need for social approval;

2. Lower status individuals would accept influence more often than higher status individuals; and

3. There would be an interaction between status and need for social approval such that individuals who possess a low need for social approval would not differ significantly in their acceptance of influence regardless of their status relative to another actor, whereas low-status–high-need-for-social-approval individuals would accept influence more often than high-status–high-need-for-social-approval individuals.

Experiment 1

The situational variable of primary interest in this study was the status of one actor relative to another in an informal task group. Previous research has demonstrated status-generalizing effects for a number of diffuse status characteristics. In the present study age was used to operationalize status, a variable previously studied in this context by Freese (Freese, 1974; Freese & Cohen, 1973) and Knottnerus and Greenstein (1981). However, although we expected that subjects would yield to the influence attempts of older persons more often than to younger persons, the primary hypothesis was that status and need for social approval would interact to determine power and prestige orders in laboratory groups.

Method

Design. The study was a 2 × 2 factorial, with need for social approval (low vs. high) and status relative to another actor (younger vs. older) as the factors. Need-for-social-approval groups were formed using a median split of scores on the Martin-Larsen Approval Motivation (MLAM) Scale[1] (Larsen, Martin, Ettinger, & Nelson, 1976; Martin, Note 1), and status was manipulated through the subject's interaction with either a 15-year-old (high-status condition) or a 25-year-old (low-status condition) partner on a cooperative task. All subjects anticipated meeting their partner following the experiment. Power and prestige orders were determined from analysis of influence rates for each subject.

Subjects. Subjects were 101 volunteers enrolled in an introductory psychology course who received course credit for their participation. All subjects were between 18 and 23 years of age.

Procedure. Subjects met for an initial large group session in which they were told that they would actually be participating in two separate, unrelated studies. The first consisted of completing the MLAM Scale along with a number of other scales. Subjects were scheduled individually for the "second" study several weeks prior to the experiment.

On arrival, each person was seated in a room equipped with a two-way audiovisual communication system. An

[1] The Martin-Larsen Approval Motivation (MLAM) Scale (as revised by Martin, Note 1) consists of 20 items that were designed to measure a person's desire to obtain approval and avoid disapproval from others in social environments. The content of the scale taps a number of dimensions thought to be of concern to the approval-motivated individual. These include such things as being well thought of by others, being liked, speaking in a group setting, taking the initiative in making important decisions, discussing controversial topics with friends, making a good impression, avoiding criticism, and so forth. Responses to the items are scored on a 5-point agree–disagree Likert format. The scale has been shown to have adequate internal consistency (Larsen, Martin, Ettinger, & Nelson, 1976) and correlates favorably with other related personality constructs (Martin, Note 1). The Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) was also administered because of its traditional use as a measure of approval-seeking motivation. However, it was not used as the primary measure of this construct because several studies have questioned the validity of the SDS as a measure of the need for approval (e.g., Larsen, Martin, & Giles, 1977; Millham, 1974; Shulman & Silverman, 1974) or have suggested that it is primarily a measure of defensiveness and not approval seeking (e.g., S. Berger, Levin, Jacobson, & Millham, 1977; Crandall, 1966; Evans, 1979; Jacobson & Ford, 1966; Jacobson, Berger, & Millham, 1970; Millham, 1974; Ramanaiah & Martin, 1980).

Nevertheless, approval-motivation groups were formed using the SDS on a post hoc basis, and parallel analyses were conducted. For Study 1, analysis of influence-rate data failed to confirm any of the hypotheses. For Study 2, the same analysis yielded results that were more consistent with those obtained using the MLAM Scale. However, the findings were not as conclusive and did not support the hypotheses as strongly as when approval-motivation groups were formed using the MLAM Scale (see Martin, 1981).

The results obtained using the SDS can be interpreted when the works of S. Berger, Levin, et al. (1977) and others are considered. The SDS was designed as a measure of attitudes toward approval in general, whereas the MLAM was designed specifically as a behavioral self-report scale focusing on attitudes toward *social* approval. Thus, if SDS scores are interpreted as reflecting primarily defensiveness (cf. Millham, 1974), then one would not expect it to predict behavior under the conditions encountered in Study 1. Conversely, the SDS should predict behavior in Study 2 because the situation encountered there was designed to elicit defensiveness. The results obtained support the notion that the SDS is more a measure of defensiveness than approval seeking, whereas the MLAM appears to have the ability to assess both dimensions through its emphasis on behavior in social settings.

experimenter gave a brief introduction to the procedures and then left the room temporarily. On returning, the experimenter announced that the experiment was ready to begin and mentioned to the subject that his or her partner was 15 years old (high-status condition) or 25 years old (low-status condition), depending on the condition to which the subject had been randomly assigned. The experimenter then explained that all further communication with the subject would be over the two-way system and left the room. Subsequently, another experimenter appeared on the television screen and introduced the study as an experiment in "communication effectiveness," examining how effectively two people could work together while communicating over a video system.

The task on which the partners would cooperate involved forming "ancillary mand grammars" (AMGs) from groups of 16 letters that appeared on the screen. The rules for forming an AMG were sufficiently ambiguous as to permit the formation of virtually any word. The object of the task was to "correctly" form as many AMGs as possible. Performance was to be assessed on a "team" basis.

As each set of letters appeared on the screen, subjects could make suggestions for words. These suggestions were then relayed by the experimenter to the subject's partner, who could either accept or reject the suggestion. This decision was then relayed back to the subject. The suggestion itself represented an influence attempt requiring either compliance or rejection. If a subject accepted a word, he or she was influenced; if the subject rejected a word, he or she was not influenced. The experiment consisted of 30 such trials, and an indicator of power and prestige was computed using the proportion of trials on which the subject was influenced.

Subjects never actually interacted with real partners. All interaction was controlled by the experimenter according to a set of random schedules for acceptances, rejections, and word suggestions. Fifty percent of all word suggestions made by subjects were accepted according to such schedules. In addition, the experimenter was blind as to which approval-motivation group the subject belonged. On completion of a comprehensive postexperimental questionnaire and interview, each subject was thoroughly debriefed. (For additional details on the task and experimental procedures, see Martin, 1981).

It should be noted that the design of the experiment departs from previous expectation states research in two major respects. First, subjects were told explicitly that they *would* meet their partner immediately following the experiment to discuss the task and the team's performance. The purpose of this manipulation was to create the anticipation of interpersonal contact and, hence, normative dependence between the subject and his or her partner. Because expectation states theory deals primarily with attributions of performance based on informational dependence, Berger and his associates (J. Berger et al., 1972, 1974, 1977) tested the theory with little attention to normative social influence between actors. It is not known whether subjects anticipated interaction with their partners in these or other experiments.

Second, expectation states research frequently introduces a (fictitious) task-related ability into the experimental setting and associates it with successful performance on the task (e.g., "contrast sensitivity," J. Berger et al., 1972; "modes of perception," Greenstein & Knottnerus, 1980; "meaning insight" and "relational insight," Webster & Driskell, 1978). However, the present study constructed a task situation that did not include an explicit task ability. Under these conditions, and given the inherent ambiguity of the experimental task, there was no specific skill or ability (outside of a general knowledge of the English language) clearly related to successful performance.[2] Not only does this have important theoretical implications but the lack of a specific ability directly instrumental to task performance more closely approximates the work environment of most task-oriented groups.

The experimental task also was constructed to resemble the give-and-take of social interaction more closely. Instead of creating a forced disagreement situation (as in most expectation states research), subjects worked together on a task, accepting and rejecting the suggestions of the other. This group task provides a more "realistic" interaction setting for the measurement of influence differences than the more traditional Interaction Control Machine (ICOM) scenario (cf. J. Berger et al., 1977, p. 47).

Results

Manipulation checks. Of the 101 subjects who completed the initial pretest measures, 7 failed to report for the experiment and 15 (16%) were excluded from the analysis because they either failed to complete the required number of trials ($n = 3$), did not understand the instructions ($n = 7$), did not perceive the age manipulation ($n = 3$), or were suspicious of the procedures ($n = 2$).[3] Analyses were performed using data obtained from the remaining 79 subjects (23 men and 56 women).

Sex differences. Subjects were blocked according to sex before assignment to experimental condition. Subsequent analyses showed that sex was unrelated to NSA group

[2] Analysis of postexperimental data indicated that only 62% of the subjects could name any skill or ability related to good performance on the task. Those abilities reported were of a very general nature, such as a knowledge of the English language, the ability to think quickly, practice at word puzzles, good visual perception, and so forth. Expression of such abilities was unrelated to experimental condition or influence rates. This suggests that the task provided a unique experience that was ambiguous enough to limit subjects' independently making a strong association between skills or abilities and successful performance.

[3] Exclusion was found to be unrelated to experimental condition and did not alter conclusions regarding the hypotheses when available data for these subjects were included in the analysis. This holds true for all analyses reported in this article.

Table 1
Influence Rates for Approval-Motivation and Status Groups Interacting Under Interpersonal-Contact Conditions

Condition	*n*	Words accepted		
		Proportion	*M*	*SD*
Low approval				
High status (1)	18	.76	22.7	2.97
Low status (2)	20	.80	23.9	2.15
High approval				
High status (3)	21	.75	22.4	3.44
Low status (4)	20	.90	26.8	1.69
Low approval	38	.78	23.3	2.60
High approval	41	.82	24.6	3.52
High status	39	.75	22.5	3.19
Low status	40	.85	25.4	2.43

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.

classification, and there were no significant differences in influence rates between men and women, nor were there major differences by experimental condition. Hence, data reported below are for the combined sample of men and women.

Influence rates. Table 1 presents the mean influence-rate data and proportion of partner's suggestions accepted for each of the four conditions in this study. In addition, these statistics are provided for approval motivation and status groups combined across levels of the other factor. An examination of these influence rates showed that, as expected, status had its greatest impact on the behavior of those individuals classified as possessing a high level of approval motivation (.90). There also was little difference between low- and high-approval seekers when they interacted with a younger partner (proportions were .76 and .75, respectively). As predicted, an overall effect for status was obtained, with high-status (HS; older) subjects accepting fewer suggestions (.75) than low-status (LS; younger) subjects (.85). This difference was in the same direction and of approximately the same magnitude as in previous studies (Freese & Cohen, 1973; Knottnerus & Greenstein, 1981).

Table 2 presents the specific comparisons necessary to confirm the hypothesis that approval motivation mediates the effect of status in task-oriented groups. The significance of the difference in each of these comparisons was determined using the Mann-Whitney *U* test.

Each of the three hypotheses was confirmed by the data. First, there was a slight but statistically significant difference between low- and high-approval groups, with high-approval (HA) persons generally accepting more influence attempts (.82) than low-approval (LA) persons (.78). Second, a main effect for status was observed in the expected direction. Finally, the predicted interaction between status and need for social approval was observed. Influence rates for LA–HS subjects were not significantly different from those of LA–LS subjects (Group 1 vs. Group 2); the difference between low- and high-approval groups, which possessed higher status relative to their partner, also was not significant (Group 1 vs. Group 3); and most importantly, LA–HS, LA–LS, and HA–HS subjects all showed significantly lower influence rates

Table 2
Mann-Whitney U Tests for Differences in Influence Between Approval-Motivation and Status Groups When Interacting Under Interpersonal-Contact Conditions

Condition	Prediction	*U*	*p*
LA–HS (1) vs. LA–LS (2)	(1) = (2)	145	.309
(1) vs. HA–HS (3)	(1) = (3)	178	.744
(1) vs. HA–LS (4)	(1) < (4)	39	<.001[a]
(2) vs. (4)	(2) < (4)	59	<.001[a]
(3) vs. (4)	(3) < (4)	47	<.001[a]
LA vs. HA	(1, 2) < (3, 4)	570	.020[a]
HS vs. LS	(1, 3) < (2, 4)	381	<.001[a]

Note. LA = low approval. HA = high approval. LS = low status. HS = high status. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.
[a] One-tailed test; all others are two-tailed.

than HA–LS subjects (Group 1 vs. Group 4, Group 2 vs. Group 4, and Group 3 vs. Group 4, respectively).

In summary, the results strongly supported the tested hypotheses. Analysis of the data indicates that status generalization is affected by individual differences and that approval-motivated subjects are more likely to be influenced by status information than low-approval persons.

Subjective evaluations of performance To understand the psychological basis for status generalization better, the postexperimental questionnaire asked subjects to rate their performance on the word task as well as that of their partner. These ratings were used to determine whether the subject thought his or her performance was "worse than" or "better than or equal to" that of their partner. Analysis showed that half (50%) of the HA–LS subjects felt their performance was worse than their partner's whereas only 35% of the LA–LS and 17% of the LA–HS subjects felt the same. However, evaluation of these findings was not significant, $\chi^2(3) = 4.69$, $p > .1$, nor was the comparison between approval motivation groups, $\chi^2(1) = 1.39$, $p > .1$, or status groups, $\chi^2(1) = 1.80$, $p > .1$.

The relation of these subjective ratings to influence was also examined. Results indicated some difference between those who rated themselves as having performed worse than their partner (.83) and those who felt their performance was equal to or better than their partner's (.79); however, this difference was not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney $U = 530$, $p \cong .074$).

Discussion

The main proposition tested in this study states that approval motivation mediates the effect of status in task-oriented groups when subjects interact under conditions of anticipated interpersonal contact. Planned comparisons between approval-motivation and status groups provided support for this proposition.

The present model suggests that the process responsible for these results involves the use of status by approval-motivated persons as a cue from which costs and benefits associated with behavior are determined. If p possesses high status relative to o, then the reward value of o's approval/disapproval is reduced. On the other hand, if p possesses low status relative to o, then the reward value of o's approval/disapproval is increased. Therefore, the differential evaluation of status information occurs primarily for high-approval seekers, resulting in behavior designed to maximize o's approval and minimize the probability of o's rejection of p. It appears that the degree of normative dependence between p and o helps to determine observable power and prestige orders and that status organizes interaction, in part, through its ability to define the value of social approval and disapproval.

It is important to compare this interpretation with that derived from expectation states theory. Using this explanatory framework, low- and high-NSA persons behave differently toward higher status partners not because of differences in the value associated with anticipated social rewards/punishments but because these individuals develop different attributions of ability on the task. If these differential attributions of ability do exist, then one would expect them to be manifested in subjective evaluations of performance. If p expects o to have greater task-related ability based on differences in status, then p should rate o's performance on the task as superior to that of p' (or his or her own performance as worse). This was not the case as evidenced by the data collected following the experiment on attributions of performance. However, it can be argued that such subjective evaluations are inappropriate assessments of differential attributions of performance as defined by expectation states theory. Therefore, a more direct test is needed to determine whether the differences in power and prestige observed between low- and high-NSA subjects are due to normative social influence or attributions of ability. One way to accomplish this is to focus on the role of interpersonal contact in the status-organizing process.

Experiment 2

In the first experiment, approval-motivated behavior of the part of high-NSA individuals was thought to have been activated

because all subjects anticipated meeting their partner immediately following the experiment. However, if interpersonal contact is prevented in the situation, then the partner's approval (or disapproval) would not be forthcoming and, therefore, should be of little consequence. To evaluate this proposition, Experiment 2 replicated the low-status conditions encountered in Experiment 1 but eliminated the expectation of interpersonal contact. We proposed that status would not organize interaction under these conditions because it would no longer define the value of social rewards/punishments; that is, normative dependence among actors would no longer exist. Specifically, it was hypothesized that

1. Individuals with a high need for social approval would not differ significantly from low-NSA subjects in their acceptance of influence from a higher status partner when interacting under conditions of no interpersonal contact;
2. High-approval persons would respond to contact with a higher status partner, whereas low-NSA persons would show little difference in influence rates across contact conditions.

Method

Design. Data from two additional groups were obtained in this experiment. One group consisted of low-NSA subjects and the other consisted of high-NSA individuals. Both groups interacted with an older partner under conditions of no interpersonal contact. Approval groups were formed using the MLAM Scale, with the same median split of scores employed in Experiment 1. Tests of the hypotheses were made through comparison of influence rates between these two groups and their counterparts from Experiment 1.

Subjects. Subjects were 52 volunteers enrolled in an introductory psychology course who participated for course credit. All participants were between 18 and 23 years of age.

Procedure. Procedures used in this study matched those in Experiment 1 with two exceptions: (a) all subjects were told that, due to time constraints, they *would not* be able to meet their partner, and (b) all subjects were in the low-status condition interacting with an older partner.

Results

Manipulation checks. Of the 52 subjects who were scheduled for the experiment, 4 failed to report and could not be rescheduled and 9 (19%) were excluded from the study because they either failed to complete the required number of trials (n = 1), did not understand the instructions (n = 4), did not perceive the age or interpersonal-contact manipulation (n = 3), or were suspicious of the procedures (n = 1). Analyses were performed using the remaining 39 subjects. No significant differences in influence rates were noted between the 20 men and 19 women in the sample, nor did subject sex affect acceptance of influence by experimental condition.

Table 3
Influence Rates for Approval-Motivation and Contact Groups for Subjects Interacting in the Low-Status Condition

Condition	n	Words accepted		
		Proportion	M	SD
Low approval				
No IPC (5)	16	.81	24.2	2.49
IPC (2)	20	.80	23.9	2.15
High approval				
No IPC (6)	23	.79	23.6	3.41
IPC (4)	20	.90	26.8	1.69
Low approval	36	.80	24.1	2.28
High approval	43	.84	25.1	3.18
No IPC	39	.79	23.8	3.05
IPC	40	.85	25.4	2.43

Note. IPC = interpersonal contact. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.

Influence rates. Table 3 presents the results for the newly tested groups (5 and 6) as well as relevant data from Experiment 1 (Groups 2 and 4). Data are also provided for approval-motivation and contact groups combined across levels of the other factor. As predicted, there was little difference in influence between the low-approval (.81) and high-approval (.79) groups when anticipation of interpersonal contact was removed from the situation. Furthermore, approval-motivated subjects responded differentially to the contact manipulation (.79 vs. .90), whereas the low-NSA subjects did not (.81 vs. .80).

Table 4 lists the specific comparisons necessary to confirm the stated hypotheses. As predicted, there was little difference between low- and high-NSA subjects when no contact was anticipated between actors (Group 5 vs.

Table 4
Mann-Whitney U Tests for Differences in Influence Between Approval-Motivation and Contact Groups When Interacting in the Low-Status Condition

Condition	Prediction	*U*	*p*
LA–No-IPC (5) vs. HA–No-IPC (6)	(5) = (6)	164	.554
(5) vs. LA–IPC (2)	(5) = (2)	133	.394
(6) vs. HA–IPC (4)	(6) < (4)	90	< .001[a]
(2) vs. (4)	(2) < (4)	59	< .001[a]

Note. LA = low approval, HA = high approval, IPC = interpersonal contact. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.
[a] One-tailed test; all others are two-tailed.

Group 6). In addition, anticipated contact had its greatest impact on the behavior of high approval seekers (Group 6 vs. Group 4), whereas it had little impact on low-NSA persons (Group 5 vs. Group 2). Based on these findings and those obtained in Experiment 1, we concluded that need for social approval interacts with status to determine power and prestige orders in task-oriented groups, but the effect is limited to conditions in which contact is anticipated between actors.

Discussion

The results obtained in this experiment place an important constraint on the findings of Experiment 1 and provide some significant insights into the processes that underlie the phenomenon of status generalization. Using the concept of normative social influence, status generalization can be viewed as a process by which actors alter their behavior in group settings to obtain social rewards and avoid social punishments. Status organizes interaction through its role in defining the value of these rewards/punishments. Assuming this is the case, individuals with a higher need for social rewards, such as approval, are expected to be more vulnerable to normative social influences and, hence, more responsive to status as a determinant of behavior. The findings of Experiment 1 support this interpretation.

Taking the view proposed by Berger and his associates (J. Berger et al., 1977), status generalization is a process based primarily on attributions of ability. Higher status actors achieve a higher ranking in the group's power and prestige hierarchy because they are perceived as having more ability on some specific skill necessary for successful completion of the task. If this is the case, then one would expect status to organize interaction regardless of whether contact is anticipated among the members of the group. On the other hand, if status generalization is contingent on the effects of social rewards/punishments, then status should fail to organize interaction when interpersonal contact (and, therefore, the expectancy of reward) is removed from the situation. The results of Experiment 2 support the latter interpretation.

Study 2

Although the experiments conducted in Study 1 appear to suggest an alternative interpretation of status generalization, they used a task environment quite different from that typically encountered in expectation states research. That is, the elements that affect q in Equation 1 were extended beyond their usual conditions. The primary objective of Study 2 was to assess the role of individual differences in mediating status generalization under conditions that more closely resemble those addressed by traditional expectation states research. This effort was designed to integrate the expectation states approach with a more comprehensive theory of social behavior based on social comparison (cf. Jones & Gerard, 1967).

Determinants of Informational Dependence and Comparative Appraisal

Whenever an individual is uncertain regarding the nature of reality or his or her ability to deal with this reality, a condition of informational dependence exists and the

person will seek to acquire information from available sources to reduce the uncertainty. Jones and Gerard (1967) suggest that through a process of comparative appraisal, individuals attempt to use others as "bench marks" to assess their relative standing on various attributes about which they are uncertain. Before the relation between social-comparison processes and status generalization can be fully considered, those aspects of personality and situations that give rise to informational dependence and comparative appraisal must be explored.

A review of research in this area indicates that a number of variables influence the degree of informational dependence and comparative appraisal that occurs in group settings. Levels of dependence are greater when there is a high degree of *uncertainty* regarding some aspect of self or one's assessment of the environment (e.g., Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Gerard, 1963; Gerard & Rabbie, 1961; Schachter, 1959; Schachter & Singer, 1962). This uncertainty may originate from an *equivocal stimulus, estimates of ability* (e.g., Di Vesta, 1959; Goldberg & Lubin, 1958; Mausner, 1954a, 1954b; Snyder, Mischel, & Lott, 1960), and/or a *lack of confidence* in one's judgment (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955; Linton & Graham, 1959). In addition, informational dependence is stronger when the attribute in question has *relevance* to group achievement and/or self-conceptions (e.g., Di Vesta, 1959; Festinger, 1954; Gerard, 1961; Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, & Zander, 1957). Finally, the availability of an appropriate *source of comparison* (such as an expert or co-oriented peer) facilitates comparative appraisal (e.g., Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Festinger, 1950, 1954; Jones & Gerard, 1967). Research conducted within the expectation states framework contains many of these elements in the definition of a task situation.

To dissociate tasks and abilities from prior cultural beliefs and experience, expectation states researchers (see Berger et al., 1980, for a review) have created laboratory situations that contain highly ambiguous tasks that require unique abilities outside of subjects' usual experience. This produces a high degree of uncertainty. Members of the group are also assumed to be collectively oriented and success motivated, with other actors considered co-oriented peers. Thus, a great deal of emphasis is placed on "team effort" and group evaluation, creating what Thibaut and Strickland (1956) called a "group set" orientation. In addition, an *instrumental task ability* (C^*) is usually introduced and directly associated with successful performance. Through this procedure subjects' attention is directed toward attributions of specific abilities, the relevance of which has been clearly established. Thus, p does not believe that success is merely a matter of chance or luck but rather that success requires possession of some particular ability. Finally, subjects are frequently uncertain as to their standing on the attribute in question. Although information concerning differences on some irrelevant, diffuse status characteristic (e.g., age, race, sex) is usually known, subjects are informationally dependent on others for estimates of ability. Thus, expectation states research has utilized a situation defined primarily by what social-influence researchers have termed *informational dependence*, and the process of forming performance expectations is quite similar to what Jones and Gerard (1967) called *comparative appraisal*.

Using a social-comparison perspective, it can be proposed that status generalizes to influence performance expectations primarily because uncertainty regarding relevant attributes of self induces a drive toward self-evaluation through comparative appraisal. Furthermore, it is proposed that perceptions of ability are affected not only by status information but also by relevant aspects of personality.

Need for Social Approval, Status, and Performance Expectations

As in Study 1, individual differences are seen as making an important contribution toward explaining variance in behavior. However, the effects observed in the previous study were attributed to the role of NSA, status, and anticipated contact in determining normative dependence among actors, whereas the present study is concerned with informational dependence. Thus, the question arises as to how approval motivation is im-

plicated in perceptions of ability and the development of performance expectations under conditions of informational dependence. The answer appears to lie in the dual nature of the approval motive.

Following Crowne and Marlowe (1964), the present research takes the view that NSA simultaneously reflects two components: (a) the desire to seek reward and (b) the desire to avoid punishment. Reward is defined by approval and positive self-evaluations, which result from approval-seeking behavior, whereas punishment is defined by disapproval and negative self-evaluations, which are avoided by taking a defensive orientation toward potentially threatening situations. It is conceivable that these two components are activated in social settings by different environmental conditions. For example, the results of Study 1 suggest that anticipation of interpersonal contact serves to activate the *approval-seeking* component of NSA under conditions of normative dependence. Concurrently, it is proposed that the *defensiveness* component of NSA is activated when informational dependence exists among actors. In Study 1, the combined effect of NSA and status was interpreted in terms of the ability of status to increase the reward value of another's approval and, hence, induce greater approval-seeking efforts on the part of high-NSA subjects. A similar process is expected to occur between the defensiveness component of NSA and status.

The specification of particular task-related abilities in a problem-solving situation tends to focus subjects' attention on success and failure and makes the outcome of the task more relevant to self-conceptions. To protect a vulnerable self-concept, approval-motivated persons should develop performance expectations in a way that minimizes threatening failure experiences and the impact of negative self-evaluations associated with failure. On the other hand, low-NSA persons should maximize potential success by attributing expectations for performance in a manner consistent with their positive self-conceptions.

The reasons for this are twofold. First, if status is differentially evaluated in our culture and thought to reflect greater overall ability (cf. J. Berger et al., 1977), then attributing greater ability to a higher status partner and behaving in a compliant manner on a collective task may help an individual avoid negative self-evaluations by increasing the probability of success. As Hurwitz, Zander, and Hymovitch (1968) noted, individuals with low relative status generally behave in an "ego defensive" manner toward high-status others because such behavior is often useful to them in achieving personal as well as group goals. Second, defensive attributions of ability help to insulate a vulnerable self-esteem if failure should result from the team's efforts. The impact of failure on self-conceptions could be reduced by shifting responsibility to the "more able" members of the group or through defensive mechanisms such as rationalization and denial (i.e., "Well, since I don't have the necessary skills, I really didn't expect to be successful anyway."). Thus, the high-NSA individual's differential attribution of ability and increased compliance to high-status others can be viewed as a defensive reaction designed to protect vulnerable self-conceptions under conditions of uncertainty and perceived threat.

However, high-NSA subjects are not expected to attribute greater ability to their partner when they possess higher relative status. Assuming, once again, that status is culturally associated with overall ability, low-status others (a) will be viewed as being less able to help in avoiding failure and (b) will make it more difficult to shift blame if failure does occur. High-NSA subjects who possess high status relative to *o* should be influenced less on the task because their partners will not be perceived as very helpful in avoiding the negative self-evaluations associated with poor performance.

We also proposed that low-NSA individuals would be less inclined to evaluate status differentially and would be affected to a lesser degree by status information in developing performance expectations. Even though informational dependence is enhanced by ambiguous tasks and the implication of personal attributes in solving a problem, low-NSA persons are expected to have greater confidence in their abilities and a higher level of aspiration. Seeking success, they should rely more on their own interpretation of a situation than on external cues. Hence, little difference in acceptance of influence is expected

for low-NSA subjects between high- and low-status situations.

In summary, the present model proposes that status generalization is a function of informational and normative dependence, both of which define q in Equation 1. Task ambiguity and uncertainty regarding relevant personal attributes determine, in part, the degree of informational dependence and comparative appraisal. High-NSA persons, because of greater feelings of uncertainty, would tend to be informationally dependent and use status information defensively in an effort to minimize the likelihood of failure and its impact on self-conceptions. On the other hand, low-NSA persons would be less dependent by virtue of greater self-confidence in their ability to deal with the situation successfully. Specifically, we proposed that

1. Individuals with a high need for social approval would accept influence more often than individuals with a low need for social approval;

2. Lower status individuals would accept influence more often than higher status individuals; and

3. There would be an interaction between status and need for social approval such that high- and low-status individuals who possess a low need for social approval would not differ significantly in their acceptance of influence, whereas low-status–high-need-for-social-approval individuals would accept influence more often than high-status–high-need-for-social-approval individuals.

Experiment 3

Although the predictions advanced in this study are similar to those made in Study 1, the proposed relations were hypothesized to involve the defensiveness component of need for social approval rather than approval-seeking motives. To remove normative dependence from the situation, the anticipation of interpersonal contact was experimentally controlled. To enhance informational dependence, the same ambiguous task used in Study 1 was employed and, following J. Berger et al. (1974), an instrumental task ability (C^*) was introduced and related directly to performance. Along with task ambiguity, this manipulation was expected to increase the level of informational dependence by increasing the relevance of performance to self-conceptions. Status of an actor relative to another was also of interest. As before, age was used to operationalize status, with the expectation that subjects would accept the suggestions of older persons more often than that of younger persons. Of primary interest, however, was the interaction of need for social approval and status in determining the power and prestige order of the group.

Method

Design. The study was a 2 × 2 factorial, with need for social approval (low vs. high) and status relative to another actor (younger vs. older) as the factors. NSA groups were formed using the same median split of scores on the MI AM Scale (Larsen et al., 1976; Martin, Note 1) as was used in Study 1. Status was manipulated through the subject's interaction with either a 15-year-old (high-status condition) or a 25-year-old (low-status condition) partner on a cooperative task. An instrumental task ability was directly associated with performance, and subjects did not expect to meet their partner at any time during or after the experiment.

Subjects. Subjects were 106 volunteers enrolled in an introductory psychology course who received course credit for their participation. All subjects were between 18 and 23 years of age.

Instrumental task ability. To increase the relevance of the task to self-conceptions, it was necessary to create a differentially evaluated ability specifically associated with performance but unrelated to the status characteristic. A specially prepared test was administered to the subjects, which supposedly measured an ability known as "Modes of Perception" (cf. Greenstein & Knottnerus, 1980). This fictitious test required the subject to view 10 slides presented over a television system and to determine which geometric figure was predominant in an ambiguous arrangement of differently shaped figures. Instructions provided with the test indicated that two different modes of perception existed—an "alpha" mode and a "beta" mode—and that persons with the beta mode typically perform the word task more efficiently than those with the alpha mode. The notion that modes of perception are closely related to successful performance and that betas perform better was also reinforced verbally by the experimenter. However, subjects were not given any indication as to which category they belonged, and any attributions of this ability were made solely by the subject without any feedback from the experimenter.

Procedure. The procedures followed during the experiment were identical to those used previously with two exceptions. First, to remove the impact of normative dependence, each subject was told that, due to time constraints, they would not be able to meet their partner during or after the experiment. Second, prior to the status and elimination-of-contact manipulations, the Modes of Perception test was administered.

Table 5
Influence Rates for Approval-Motivation and Status Groups Interacting Under Task-Ability and No-Interpersonal-Contact Conditions

Condition	*n*	Words accepted		
		Proportion	*M*	*SD*
Low approval				
High status (7)	18	.74	22.1	3.66
Low status (8)	20	.80	24.1	2.81
High approval				
High status (9)	20	.76	22.9	3.81
Low status (10)	19	.88	26.5	2.06
Low approval	38	.77	23.2	3.35
High approval	39	.82	24.6	3.54
High status	38	.75	22.5	3.71
Low status	39	.84	25.3	2.72

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.

Results

Manipulation checks. Of the 106 subjects who completed the initial pretest measures, 16 failed to report for the experiment and could not be rescheduled. In addition, 13 (14%) were excluded from the analysis because they either failed to complete the required number of trials ($n = 2$), did not understand the instructions ($n = 4$), did not perceive the age manipulation or expected to meet their partner ($n = 5$), or were suspicious of the procedures ($n = 2$). Therefore, analyses were performed using data from the remaining 77 subjects (38 men and 39 women).

Sex differences. Subjects were blocked according to sex prior to assignment to experimental condition. Subsequent analyses showed that sex was unrelated to approval-group classification and no significant differences in influence rates were noted between men and women by experimental condition. Hence, data reported below are for the combined sample of men and women.

Influence rates. Table 5 presents the mean influence-rate data and proportion of partner's suggestions accepted for each of the four conditions in this experiment. These statistics are also provided for approval-motivation and status groups combined across levels of the other factor. Inspection of these influences rates shows that, as expected, status had its greatest impact on high-approval–low-status subjects (.88). This proportion is greater than the average influence rate observed for low-approval subjects interacting under the same status condition (.80). In addition, when subjects interacted with a younger partner, there was little difference in acceptance of influence between low- and high-NSA individuals (proportions were .74 and .76, respectively). The overall effect of status was quite similar to that observed in Study 1, with high-status subjects showing lower acceptance of influence (.75) than low-status subjects (.84). Finally, the overall influence rate for the high-NSA subjects (.82) was greater than that of low-NSA individuals (.77), as predicted.

It was proposed that, under conditions of informational dependence, approval motivation would mediate the status-organizing process in much the same manner as under conditions of normative dependence. Table 6 lists the specific comparisons necessary to confirm this hypothesis. Tests of significance for each of these planned comparisons were conducted using the Mann-Whitney *U* test.

Each of the three major hypotheses was confirmed. First, we predicted that need for social approval (Groups 7 and 8 vs. Groups 9 and 10) and status (Groups 7 and 9 vs. Groups 8 and 10) would each have a significant overall effect on influence rates. Both predictions were confirmed. Second, the expected mediating effect of NSA on status generalization was observed. Even though the

Table 6
Mann-Whitney U Tests for Differences Between Approval-Motivation and Status Groups When Interacting Under Task-Ability and No-Interpersonal-Contact Conditions

Condition	Prediction	*U*	*p*
LA–HS (7) vs. LA–LS (8)	(7) = (8)	117	.065
(7) vs. HA–HS (9)	(7) = (9)	153	.436
(7) vs. HA–LS (10)	(7) < (10)	39	< .001[a]
(8) vs. (10)	(8) < (10)	89	.002[a]
(9) vs. (10)	(9) < (10)	76	< .001[a]
LA vs. HA	(7, 8) < (9, 10)	511	.010[a]
HS vs. LS	(7, 9) < (8, 10)	404	< .001[a]

Note. LA = low approval. HA = high approval. LS = low status. HS = high status. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.
[a] One-tailed test; all others are two-tailed.

difference in influence rate between the LA–LS and LA–HS groups was greater than anticipated (Group 7 vs. Group 8), this difference was not considered to be substantively important. The difference between low- and high-approval groups interacting under high-status conditions also was not significant (Group 7 vs. Group 9). Most importantly, LA–HS, LA–LS, and HA–HS subjects all showed significantly lower influence rates than HA–LS subjects (Group 7 vs. Group 10; Group 8 vs. Group 10; and Group 9 vs. Group 10, respectively).

In summary, the data strongly supported the tested hypotheses and indicate that need for social approval continues to mediate the status-organizing process even when interpersonal contact with other actors and, hence, approval-seeking motives were minimized in the situation.

Subjective evaluations of performance. As in Study 1, the postexperimental questionnaire asked subjects to rate their performance and that of their partner on the word-formation task. Subsequently, these ratings were used to determine whether subjects thought their performance was "worse than" or "better than or equal to" their partner's. In Study 1, analysis showed that these ratings were not significantly related to approval–status condition and only weakly associated with influence rates. However, the present study focused on the role of performance expectations in determining power and prestige orders. Thus, one would expect to observe a significant relation between these performance ratings and experimental condition.

In the present study, only 11% of the LA–HS and 35% of the LA–LS subjects rated their performance as "worse than" their partner's. This was virtually identical to the 17% and 35% figures obtained for the corresponding groups in Study 1. However, a marked change in the ratings of the high-approval subjects occurred in the present study. Of the HA–HS subjects, 45% reported their performance as worse than their partner's (as compared with 33% in Study 1), and 74% of the HA–LS subjects reported lower relative performance (as compared with 50% in Study 1). The pattern across the four experimental conditions was statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 15.40$, $p < .002$, and generally paralleled the behavioral data. In addition, the relation between these subjective ratings and influence rates was examined. Results showed that those subjects rating their performance as worse than their partner's accepted significantly more word suggestions (.84) when compared with those rating their performance as equal to or better than their partner's (.76; Mann-Whitney $U = 461$, $p < .004$).

Thus, in Study 1 subjective evaluations of performance were not significantly related to either experimental condition or influence rates. However, with the enhancement of informational dependence through the introduction of a specific performance ability, these subjective evaluations were significantly related not only to experimental condition but to influence rates as well.

To assess subjective evaluations of performance further, the postexperimental questionnaire asked subjects to report to which Mode of Perception group they thought they belonged. Results indicated that 62% thought they were in the alpha (inferior) group, whereas 38% reported being in the beta (superior) group. Analysis of these results by experimental condition indicated that, although status had no effect on these ratings (62% alphas and 38% betas for each condition), the majority (56%) of the low-NSA subjects felt that they were in the superior beta group, whereas the majority (79%) of the high-NSA subjects felt that they were in the inferior alpha group, $\chi^2(1) = 7.95$, $p < .005$.

Each subject was also asked to indicate to which Mode of Perception group they thought their partner belonged. Of the 77 subjects, 15 (19%) had no idea and felt that they could not give a reasonable answer. Responses for the remaining 62 subjects were combined with estimates of their own classification to form two categories: self-alpha–partner-beta (inferior to partner) and self equal to or better than partner. Results showed that only 6% of the LA–HS, 28% of the LA–LS, and 27% of the HA–HS subjects rated themselves as inferior to their partner on the required task ability. On the other hand, the majority (54%) of the HA–LS subjects felt they were in an inferior position relative to their partner. These data were statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 8.17$, $p < .043$, and followed the same general pattern established for influence rates

and other subjective evaluations of performance.

Discussion

Planned comparisons between approval-motivation and status groups provided support for the proposition that NSA mediates the effect of status in task-oriented groups when conditions of uncertainty exist and when specific abilities are made salient through their association with task performance. Influence-rate data and subjective evaluations of performance also support the hypothesis that the behavior observed was due in large measure to informational dependence among actors. More specifically, it is suggested that high-NSA individuals use status information to a greater extent than low-NSA persons when making attributions of ability because they lack confidence in their ability and adopt a defensive orientation toward situations that involve a potential threat to self-conceptions. Differential attributions of ability appear to serve an ego-defensive function by minimizing failure experiences, thereby protecting a vulnerable self-esteem. On the other hand, low-NSA subjects were influenced by status information to a lesser degree by virtue of their reduced dependence on others for self-evaluation and greater confidence in their ability to deal successfully with uncertain situations.

This interpretation has implications for understanding the expectation states approach to status generalization. Even though the experimental conditions closely resembled those used in typical expectation states experiments, individual differences in NSA were predictive of observable power and prestige. Actors used status as a means of assessing uncertain personal attributes that were relevant to performance. However, it appears that status information is used primarily by high-NSA individuals. NSA helps to define q in Equation 1 under conditions of informational as well as normative dependence.

Although the data clearly support the involvement of NSA in the process of status generalization, the defensiveness interpretation is only supported indirectly. Interpretation of subjective evaluations of performance and ability is difficult because they were obtained following interaction. As in Study 1, a more direct test is needed to determine whether informational dependence and comparative appraisal are responsible for the differences in power and prestige observed between low- and high-NSA subjects. If informational dependence is affected by the relevance of specific abilities to self-conceptions, as suggested by Festinger (1954) and others, then elimination of relevant abilities should reduce informational dependence and comparative appraisal, thereby reducing perceived threat and defensive attributions on the part of high-NSA persons. To evaluate this relevance question, an additional analysis was conducted that focused on the role of C^* in the status-organizing process.

Experiment 4

Previous theory and research have indicated that the specification of an ability relevant to group success appears to increase informational dependence by making the information associated with ability useful in structuring an ambiguous situation. Such information also increases the impact of success and failure on self-conceptions. For example, success or failure on an ambiguous task in which no specific ability is clearly implicated provides little feedback regarding one's competence or ability to deal with future situations. On the other hand, success on a task that is known to reflect a particular ability should have a favorable impact on self-conceptions just as failure on such a task should have negative implications for self-esteem. If an instrumental task ability is missing in the situation and if the task is so ambiguous that individuals are unable to independently associate specific abilities with performance, then success or failure will provide little information regarding competence and have only minor implications for self-conceptions.

To evaluate this proposition, data from selected conditions in Experiment 2 were combined with selected conditions from Experiment 3. This created an analysis in which low- and high-NSA persons interacted with an older partner under conditions in which an instrumental task ability was either pres-

Table 7
Influence Rates for Approval-Motivation and Task-Ability Groups Interacting Under Low-Status Conditions With No Interpersonal Contact Anticipated

Condition	*n*	Words accepted		
		Proportion	*M*	*SD*
Low approval				
No C* (5)	16	.81	24.2	2.49
C* (8)	20	.80	24.1	2.81
High approval				
No C* (6)	23	.79	23.6	3.41
C* (10)	19	.88	26.5	2.06
Low approval	36	.81	24.2	2.63
High approval	42	.83	24.9	3.20
No C*	39	.79	23.8	3.05
C*	39	.84	25.3	2.72

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number. C* = instrumental task ability.

ent or absent in the situation. In addition, normative dependence was minimized in all conditions because subjects did not anticipate meeting their partner. Specifically, we hypothesized that

1. Individuals with a high need for social approval would not differ significantly from low-NSA subjects in their acceptance of influence from higher status partners when no task ability is present;

2. High-NSA persons would respond to high-status partners with higher influence rates when ability information is relevant to performance. On the other hand, low-NSA persons would show little difference in influence regardless of whether a specific task ability is related to performance.

Method

Design. Information from previous conditions was used to test the stated hypotheses. A 2 × 2 design was constructed, with low- and high-NSA subjects interacting in a situation in which no task ability was present (No C*) or given the presence of a specific ability (C*) directly related to performance. The conditions included Groups 8 (LA–C*) and 10 (HA–C*) from Experiment 3 and Groups 5 (LA–No C*) and 6 (HA–No C*) from Experiment 2.

Subjects. This combination of prior experimental conditions included data for 78 individuals (39 men and 39 women) enrolled in introductory psychology classes who received course credit for their participation.

Procedure. Procedures employed were the same as those used in Experiments 2 and 3. However, it should be emphasized that all subjects were told that, due to time constraints, they would not be able to meet their partner, and all subjects were in the low-status condition interacting with an older partner. Those subjects in the C* conditions were given the Modes of Perception test just prior to interaction on the task, whereas those in the No C* conditions were not given any information regarding the relation of ability to task performance.

Results

Influence rates. Table 7 presents results for the relevant groups from Experiment 3 (Groups 8 and 10) as well as Experiment 2 (Groups 5 and 6). Data are also provided for approval-motivation and task-ability groups combined across levels of the other factor. As predicted, there was little difference in influence rates between low-NSA (.81) and high-NSA (.79) subjects when no task ability was specified in the situation. In addition, high-approval subjects responded differentially to the task-ability manipulation (.79 vs. .88), whereas the low-NSA subjects did not (.81 vs. .80).

Table 8 lists the specific comparisons necessary to confirm the stated hypotheses. As

Table 8
Mann-Whitney U Tests for Differences in Influence Between Approval-Motivation and Task-Ability Groups When Interacting Under Low-Status and No-Interpersonal-Contact Conditions

Condition	Prediction	*U*	*p*
LA–No-C* (5) vs. HA–No-C* (6)	(5) = (6)	164	.554
(5) vs. LA–C* (8)	(5) = (8)	155	.872
(6) vs. HA–C* (10)	(6) < (10)	99	< .001[a]
(8) vs. (10)	(8) < (10)	89	.002[a]

Note. LA = low approval. HA = high approval. C* = instrumental task ability. Numbers in parentheses indicate group number.
[a] One-tailed test; all others are two-tailed.

predicted, there was little difference between low- and high-NSA subjects when no task ability was specified (Group 5 vs. Group 6). In addition, ability information had its greatest impact on the behavior of high-approval subjects (Group 6 vs. Group 10) and had little effect on low-NSA persons (Group 5 vs. Group 8). We concluded that the specification of a relevant task ability is an important aspect of group interaction and an important element in status generalization. Specification of a relevant task ability also appears to be a necessary catalyst for the interaction of need for social approval and status under conditions defined by informational dependence.

Discussion

This analysis establishes the presence of a specific task ability as an important independent variable in group situations that appears to increase informational dependence and defensiveness on the part of high-NSA individuals. When particular personal attributes become the focus of attention and are directly associated with performance, success and failure have important implications for the self-concept. Success or failure on an ambiguous task that does not appear to be related to any particular skill or ability provides an individual with little information regarding relevant aspects of self. Conversely, when a task clearly implicates even fictitious abilities, there exists an opportunity for positive self-evaluation as well as for a threat to the self-concept.

Consistent with this perspective, both low- and high-NSA persons in this experiment behaved in a similar manner when specific abilities were not relevant to performance. In addition, low-NSA subjects showed little reaction to the presence of a task ability because of their favorable attribution of ability based on positive self-conceptions. On the other hand, high-NSA subjects showed significant changes in behavior across C^* conditions because they tend to form performance expectations in a defensive manner to minimize the threat of failure. Informational dependence and the extent to which a task is viewed as threatening are apparently related to whether relevant personal attributes are associated with performance.

General Discussion

The results of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that personality factors in association with relevant situational variables are useful in predicting the formation of power and prestige orders in task-oriented groups. Inclusion of individual differences in need for social approval, along with such factors as anticipated interpersonal contact and specification of relevant task abilities, appears to provide a more complete explanation of how and why status organizes interaction than consideration of status differences alone. The findings of these studies suggest that the role of such psychological constructs as normative and informational dependence in the status-organizing process should receive greater attention in future formulations of expectation states theory. Continued efforts to integrate theory and research from such areas as conformity and social comparison with that of expectation states should greatly enhance our understanding of status generalization and further the accumulation of knowledge on the subject.

The research reported in the first section of this report demonstrates the importance of need for social approval and anticipated interpersonal contact as mediators of status information. Similar to the findings of Fisek and Ofshe (1970), the attributes of participants themselves are often the variables that determine a group's status structure. This suggests that status generalization depends, in part, on factors that lie beyond the properties of interaction itself. The research reported in the second section defined interaction under conditions similar to those encountered in more traditional expectation states research. Once again, need for social approval mediated the status structure of the group. However, the presence of an instrumental task ability was an important variable in producing the effect. Thus, the forces responsible for status generalization do not appear to be located solely within the personal disposition of the actors. Instead, the present view postulates a dynamic interplay between personal attributes and situational factors that interact to maximize approval and positive self-evaluations and minimize disapproval and negative self-evaluations associated with social interaction.

Social and Task Environments

Even though it is assumed that group members are motivated to work cooperatively to achieve a successful outcome on a task, there remains a larger *social environment* that serves as the container in which task-related behaviors are carried out. This social environment is defined by the nature of the relationships among group members. It provides a context for task completion, including such behaviors as performance outputs, action opportunities, evaluations, and influence. To appreciate a phenomenon as complex as status generalization fully, this social environment must be carefully considered. Indeed, this aspect of the environment was operative in early studies of status generalization (e.g., Caudill, 1958; Katz, 1970; Strodtbeck et al., 1957; Torrance, 1973) from which expectation states theory developed.

Although finding a successful solution to the problem facing the group is important, social relationships simultaneously provide group members with opportunities to satisfy other personal needs and objectives. Furthermore, the social environment can be described, in part, by interpersonal contact and status. It is proposed that these parameters interact with need for social approval to determine the level of normative dependence among group members and, hence, power and prestige orderings. NSA defines motive strength; anticipation of interpersonal contact defines the expectancy of reward; and status defines the reward value of potential approval/disapproval.

In combination with forces originating from the social environment, the *task environment* also affects individual behavior in group settings. As a member of a collectively oriented group, success is an important ingredient in the situation. Not only does it influence how we feel about others in the group but it also affects how we feel about ourselves. However, before effective behavior can be initiated, information must be gathered regarding the nature of the task, group goals, performance standards, as well as each member's standing on attributes relevant to the task. In other words, the task environment reflects the degree to which members are dependent on one another for information regarding the nature of reality and their ability to deal with it. Like the social environment, informational dependence can be described by a number of key parameters. The research reported here has focused on two: the status of the source of comparison and the presence of a specific ability related to performance. We hypothesized that status and the presence of specific performance abilities interact with need for social approval to determine the level of informational dependence in a given situation. If a specific ability is relevant to performance, it also becomes relevant to self-conceptions and serves as an object of social comparison. High-NSA individuals, being more uncertain regarding their relative standing on such abilities, attribute performance expectations so as to minimize threatening failure experiences, thereby protecting a vulnerable self-concept. Low-NSA individuals, on the other hand, rely more on feelings of confidence in their ability to handle uncertain situations and attribute performance expectations so as to maximize potential success.

The Dual Nature of Need for Social Approval

This theoretical perspective regarding the differing response of low- and high-NSA individuals to particular aspects of social and task environments requires a complex interpretation of need for social approval that encompasses both approval seeking and defensiveness. The present conceptualization of NSA accommodates both facets of approval motivation. In addition, use of the MLAM Scale in Studies 1 and 2 produced results that support the present interpretation of need for social approval. It also appears that these two aspects of NSA are activated by differing environmental parameters. The anticipation of interpersonal contact seems to activate the approval-seeking component of NSA, whereas the specification of task-related abilities seems to activate the defensiveness component. In other words, approval seeking is more closely associated with normative dependence, whereas defensiveness is more closely associated with informational dependence. The relation of different aspects of personality to these types of dependence is not a new concept. For example, McDavid and Sistrunk (1964) proposed and obtained some support

for the notion that certain personality dimensions predict behavior in situations defined primarily by normative dependence (e.g., timidity, deference to others, reluctance to speak out, strong needs for approval and/or acceptance), whereas other dimensions predict behavior under conditions of informational dependence (e.g., trust and faith in others, respect for others, conventionality). The present research goes beyond this conceptualization to define specifically what aspects of personality are involved with each type of dependence, why they are involved, and under what conditions they will be activated.

Activation

The notion that certain personality factors are activated by different environmental circumstances is also not a new concept (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; McClelland, 1958; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). However, the present approach to the study of need for social approval has not only tried to implement the concept of activation but also has attempted to incorporate suggestions made in more recent discussions of the role of personality in predicting social behavior (cf. Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980). Following Argyle and Little (1972), Bem and Funder (1978), Endler (1973), Endler and Hunt (1968), Endler and Magnusson (1976), Hunt (1965), and Magnusson and Endler (1977), the present research has attempted to increase the utility of personality as an explanatory factor in social behavior by focusing on person–situation interactions rather than viewing personality as a global characteristic operating in a simplistic, uniform fashion across all situations. By taking this interactive approach, it is expected that greater consistency in prediction and transituational generality will be achieved. Thus, the current approach to the role of personality in status generalization has attempted to incorporate the recommendations of Block (1968), Mischel (1969), and others by taking into account the stimulus value of the situation in regulating behavior.

In conclusion, a number of different lines of research are envisioned whereby the basic expectation states model can be extended to predict behavior in various task and social environments. Such factors as task ambiguity and social support need to be systematically studied to obtain a more complete understanding of how normative and informational dependence operate in the status-organizing process. Once these processes are better understood, then the applicability of expectation states theory may be extended to encompass a greater range of group behaviors and outcomes resulting from collective action.

Reference Note

1. Martin, H. J. *A revised measure of approval motivation and some correlates.* Unpublished manuscript, Department of Management and Labor, Cleveland State University, 1981.

References

Argyle, M. Social pressure in public and private situations. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 1957, *54,* 172–175.

Argyle, M., & Little, B. R. Do personality traits apply to social behavior? *Journal of Theory of Social Behavior,* 1972, *2,* 1–35.

Asch, S. E. Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs,* 1956, *70*(9, Whole No. 416).

Atkinson, J. W. Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. *Psychological Review,* 1957, *64,* 359–372.

Bales, R. F. The equilibrium problem in small groups. In T. Parsons, R. F. Bales, & E. H. Shils (Eds.), *Working papers in the theory of action.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953.

Bales, R. F., & Slater, P. Role differentiation in small decision making groups. In T. Parsons & R. F. Bales (Eds.), *Family, socialization, and interaction processes.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955.

Bem, D. J., & Funder, D. C. Predicting more of the people more of the time: Assessing the personality of situations. *Psychological Review,* 1978, *85,* 485–501.

Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch, M., Jr. Status characteristics and social interaction. *American Sociological Review,* 1972, *37,* 241–255.

Berger, J., Conner, T. L., & Fisek, M. H. *Expectation states theory: A theoretical research program.* Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1974.

Berger, J., Fisek, M. H., Norman, R. Z., & Zelditch, M., Jr. *Status characteristics and social interaction: An expectation-states approach.* New York: Elsevier, 1977.

Berger, J., Rosenholtz, S. J., & Zelditch, M., Jr. Status organizing processes. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 1980, *6,* 479–508.

Berger, S. E., Levin, P., Jacobson, L. I., & Millham, J. Gain approval or avoid disapproval: Comparison of motive strengths in high need for approval scorers. *Journal of Personality,* 1977, *45,* 458–468.

Block, J. Some reasons for the apparent inconsistency

of personality. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1968, *70*, 210–212.

Caudill, W. *The psychiatric hospital as a small society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Coopersmith, S. *The antecedents of self-esteem*. San Francisco: Freeman, 1967.

Crandall, V. C. Personality characteristics and social and achievement behaviors associated with children's social desirability response tendencies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1966, *4*, 477–486.

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. *The approval motive*. New York: Wiley, 1964.

Crutchfield, R. S. Conformity and character. *American Psychologist*, 1955, *10*, 191–198.

Darley, J. M., & Berscheid, E. Increased liking as a result of the anticipation of personal contact. *Human Relations*, 1967, *20*, 29–40.

Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1955, *51*, 629–636.

Dittes, J. E. Attractiveness of group as function of self-esteem and acceptance by group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1959, *59*, 77–82.

Dittes, J. E., & Kelley, H. H. Effects of different conditions of acceptance upon conformity to group norms. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1956, *53*, 100–107.

Di Vesta, F. J. Effects of confidence and motivation on susceptibility to informational social influence. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1959, *59*, 204–209.

Endler, N. S. The person versus the situation—A pseudo issue? *Journal of Personality*, 1973, *41*, 287–303.

Endler, N. S., & Hunt, J. McV. Inventories of hostility and comparisons of the proportions of variance from persons, responses, and situations for hostility and anxiousness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1968, *9*, 309–315.

Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. Toward an interactional psychology of personality. *Psychology Bulletin*, 1976, *83*, 956–974.

Evans, R. G. The relationship of the Marlowe-Crowne scale and its components to defensive preferences. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 1979, *43*, 406–410.

Festinger, L. Informal social communication. *Psychological Review*, 1950, *57*, 271–282.

Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 1954, *7*, 117–140.

Fisek, M. H., & Ofshe, R. The process of status evolution. *Sociometry*, 1970, *33*, 327–346.

Freese, L. Conditions for status equality in informal task groups. *Sociometry*, 1974, *37*, 174–188.

Freese, L., & Cohen, B. P. Eliminating status generalization. *Sociometry*, 1973, *36*, 177–193.

Gerard, H. B. Some determinants of self-evaluation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, *62*, 188–293.

Gerard, H. B. Emotional uncertainty and social comparison. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, *66*, 568–573.

Gerard, H. B. Conformity and commitment to the group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1964, *68*, 209–211.

Gerard, H. B., & Rabbie, J. M. Fear and social comparison. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, *62*, 586–592.

Goldberg, S. C., & Lubin, A. Influence as a function of perceived judgment error. *Human Relations*, 1958, *2*, 275–280.

Greenstein, T. N., & Knottnerus, J. D. The effects of differential evaluations on status generalization. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 1980, *43*, 147–154.

Homans, G. C. *Social behavior: Its elementary forms* (Rev. ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974.

Humphreys, R., & Berger, J. Theoretical consequences of the status characteristics formulation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1981, *86*, 953–983.

Hunt, J. McV. Traditional personality theory in the light of recent evidence. *American Scientist*, 1965, *53*, 80–96.

Hurwitz, J. I., Zander, A. F., & Hymovitch, B. Some effects of power on the relations among group members. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Research and theory* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

Insko, C. A., & Wilson, M. Interpersonal attraction as a function of social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1977, *35*, 903–911.

Jackson, J. M., & Saltzstein, H. D. The effect of person-group relationships on conformity processes. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1958, *57*, 17–24.

Jacobson, L. I., Berger, S. E., & Millham, J. Individual differences in cheating during a temptation period when confronting failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1970, *15*, 48–56.

Jacobson, L. I., & Ford, L. H. Need for approval, defensive denial, and sensitivity to cultural stereotypes. *Journal of Personality*, 1966, *34*, 596–609.

Jones, E. E., & Daugherty, B. Political orientation and the perceptual effects of an anticipated interaction. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1959, *59*, 340–349.

Jones, E. E., & Gerard, H. B. *Foundations of social psychology*. New York: Wiley, 1967.

Jones, E. E., Gergen, K. J., & Jones, R. G. Tactics of ingratiation among leaders and subordinates in a status hierarchy. *Psychological Monographs*, 1963, *77*(3, Whole No. 566).

Katz, I. Experimental studies of Negro-white relationships. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 5). New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Kelley, H. H. The two functions of reference groups. In G. E. Swanson, T. N. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), *Readings in social psychology* (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1952.

Kenrick, D. T., & Stringfield, D. O. Personality traits and the eye of the beholder: Crossing some traditional philosophical boundaries in the search for consistency in all of the people. *Psychological Review*, 1980, *87*, 88–104.

Knottnerus, J. D., & Greenstein, T. N. Status and performance characteristics in social interaction: A theory of status validation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 1981, *44*, 338–349.

Larsen, K. S., Martin, H. J., Ettinger, R. H., & Nelson, J. Approval seeking, social cost, and aggression: A

scale and some dynamics. *Journal of Psychology*, 1976, *94*, 3–11.

Larsen, K. S., Martin, H. J., & Giles, H. Anticipated social cost and interpersonal accommodation. *Human Communication Research*, 1977, *3*, 303–308.

Layton, B. D., & Insko, C. A. Anticipated interaction and the similarity-attraction effect. *Sociometry*, 1974, *37*, 149–162.

Linton, H., & Graham, E. Personality correlates of persuasibility. In C. I. Hovland & I. L. Janis (Eds.), *Personality and persuasibility*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959.

Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. Group cohesiveness, communication level, and conformity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, *62*, 408–412.

Magnusson, D., & Endler, N. S. (Eds.). *Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional psychology*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

Marlowe, D., & Gergen, K. J. Personality and social behavior. In K. J. Gergen & D. Marlowe (Eds.), *Personality and social behavior*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970.

Martin, H. J. Individual differences in status generalization: Need for social approval as a determinant of influence in task-oriented groups (Doctoral dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1980). *Dissertation Abstracts International*, 1981, *41*, 3233B. (University Microfilms No. 81-02390)

Mausner, B. The effect of one partner's success in a relevant task on the interaction of observer pairs. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1954, *49*, 557–560. (a)

Mausner, B. The effect of prior reinforcement on the interaction of observer pairs. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1954, *49*, 65–68. (b)

McClelland, D. C. Methods of measuring human motivation. In J. W. Atkinson (Ed.), *Motives in fantasy, action, and society*. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1958.

McClelland, D. C., Atkinson, J. W., Clark, R. A., & Lowell, E. L. *The achievement motive*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

McDavid, J. W., & Sistrunk, F. Personality correlates of two kinds of conforming behavior. *Journal of Personality*, 1964, *32*, 420–435.

McGhee, P. E., & Teevan, R. C. Conformity behavior and need for affiliation. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1967, *72*, 117–121.

McGuire, W. J. Personality and susceptibility to social influence. In E. F. Borgatta & W. W. Lambert (Eds.), *Handbook of personality theory and research*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1968.

Meeker, B. F., & Weitzel-O'Neill, P. A. Sex roles and interpersonal behavior in task oriented groups. *American Sociological Review*, 1977, *42*, 92–105.

Millham, J. Two components of need for approval score and their relationship to cheating following success and failure. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 1974, *8*, 378–392.

Mischel, W. Continuity and change in personality. *American Psychologist*, 1969, *24*, 1012–1018.

Moore, J. C., Jr. Status and influence in small group interactions. *Sociometry*, 1968, *31*, 47–63.

Mouton, J. S., Blake, R. R., & Olmstead, J. A. The relationship between frequency of yielding and the disclosure of personal identity. *Journal of Personality*, 1956, *24*, 339–347.

Pugh, M. D., & Wahrman, R. Neutralizing sexism in mixed-sex groups: Do women have to be better than men? *American Journal of Sociology*, 1983, *88*, 746–762.

Ramanaiah, N. V., & Martin, H. J. On the two-dimensional nature of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 1980, *44*, 507–514.

Satow, K. L. Social approval and helping. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 1975, *11*, 501–509.

Schachter, S. *The psychology of affiliation*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Schachter, S., & Singer, J. Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review*, 1962, *69*, 379–399.

Shulman, A. D., & Silverman, I. Social desirability and need approval: Some paradoxical data and a conceptual re-evaluation. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 1974, *13*, 27–32.

Snyder, A. F., Mischel, W., & Lott, B. E. Value, information, and conformity behavior. *Journal of Personality*, 1960, *28*, 333–341.

Stotland, E., Thorley, S., Thomas, E., Cohen, A. R., & Zander, A. The effects of group expectations and self-esteem upon self-evaluation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *54*, 55–63.

Strodtbeck, F. L., James, R. M., & Hawkins, C. Social status in jury deliberations. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 713–719.

Strodtbeck, F. L., & Mann, R. D. Sex role differentiation in jury deliberations. *Sociometry*, 1956, *19*, 3–11.

Thibaut, J. W., & Strickland, L. Psychological set and social conformity. *Journal of Personality*, 1956, *25*, 115–129.

Torrance, E. P. Some consequences of power differences in decision-making in permanent and temporary three-man groups. In R. Ofshe (Ed.), *Interpersonal behavior in small groups*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Tyler, T. R., & Sears, D. O. Coming to like obnoxious people when we must live with them. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1977, *35*, 200–211.

Webster, M., Jr., & Driskell, J. E., Jr. Status generalization: A review and some new data. *American Sociological Review*, 1978, *43*, 220–236.

Wyer, R. S. Effects of incentive to perform well, group attraction, and group acceptance on conformity in a judgmental task. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1966, *4*, 21–26.

Zelditch, M., Jr., Lauderdale, P., & Stublarec, S. How are inconsistencies between status and ability resolved? *Social Forces*, 1980, *50*, 1025–1043.

Received May 17, 1982 ■